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Abstract
A stated-preference approach is used to elicit the attitudes of the general public towards
coyotes conservation. The payment vehicle is presented in a way that explicitly prompts indi-
viduals to adopt a citizen perspective, rather than a consumer perspective, when responding
to the survey. To deal with the large numbers of zero responses, a Box-Cox Double Hur-
dle speciﬁcation is used to model separately individuals’ choices about whether to support
conservation or not and their choice about the degree of support. The results show that
simpler analyses that do not account explicitly for this two diﬀerent decisions would lead to
misleading conclusions in the study of nuisance wildlife. The study uses a survey conducted
in Prince Edward Island (Canada).
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Non-consumptive values derived from wildlife cannot be readily elicited from the observation of
market transactions. However, when policy debates arise on the desirability of wildlife preserva-
tion (or removal), it is essential to have an idea about how much society considers right for the
government to spend in order to promote conservation (or removal) of wildlife. Traditionally,
the contingent valuation method has been suggested as the tool to estimate the value placed
on wildlife species, under the assumption that individuals, when presented with hypothetical
markets, reveal their individual willingness to pay for the resource, as they would do in the case
of any conventional private good. From the individual valuations, the method aggregates into a
social valuation measure.
In this paper, we model the attitudes of residents in Prince Edward Island (PEI) towards
coyotes in terms of their stated support of an increase in taxes to fund a coyote protection scheme.
Recently, there has been some debate in this Canadian province about whether a bounty should
be imposed on coyotes to reduce the costs they allegedly impose on the sheep-farming industry.
However, there is no study available about the non-use beneﬁts of coyotes in Canada.
This paper departs from the conventional contingent valuation approach in a crucial respect.
The payment vehicle explicitly prompted respondents to adopt a social viewpoint when answer-
ing the valuation question. In this sense, the problem of distinguishing between citizen versus
consumer preferences when dealing with environmental goods was avoided (Blamey et al. 1995;
Sagoﬀ, 1998; Nyborg, 2000). To the author’s knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that this approach
is used in the case of wildlife. The drawback of this approach is that the results of the valuation
process cannot be understood in the same sense as those resulting from a traditional contin-
gent valuation process, whereby respondents are assumed to adopt a purely-private consumer
viewpoint.
However, rather than focusing on the valuation of the species, the paper focuses on the
explicit distinction between factors aﬀecting whether individuals state that they support coyote
conservation and factors that aﬀect the stated degree of support. This is especially relevant in
this case, since some individuals consider coyotes a public bad instead of a public good. This
is achieved by using a Double-Hurdle speciﬁcation when modelling individuals’ responses as a
1function of socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics of each respondent. A growing number
of studies deal with this issue in the case of dichotomous-choice analysis (based on so-called Spike
Models1), but almost no attention has been paid to the case of analyses that employ open-ended
questions. Reiser and Schechter (1999) note the lack of studies addressing the problem of non-
participation in studies based on open-ended questions, while Langford et al. (1998) constitute
a rare exception to this trend.
The results show that this more ﬂexible speciﬁcation explains better the support individuals
say would give to coyote conservation. The variation in stated bid values is explained by sociode-
mographic variables of the individuals and of their county of residence, and by the individuals’
attitudes towards wildlife.
The next section describes some previous studies dealing with the valuation of wildlife species
and the debate about the use of contingent valuation studies on the base of stated consumer
versus citizen preferences. The data collection process is described next. The theoretical model
and a summary of the econometric exercises follows. Finally, the results are discussed and some
conclusions extracted.
2B a c k g r o u n d
Perhaps the most commonly used stated-preference method to estimate non-consumptive values
is the contingent valuation method (CVM). This consists of directly asking people to state the
value they place on the change of quantity or quality of a certain environmental resource. This
method has been widely applied during the last decades (see, for further theoretical details
and reviews of empirical applications, Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Braden and Kolstad, 1991;
Freeman, 1993; Hanemann, 1994; Diamond and Hausman, 1994).
Many CVM studies have been applied to other wildlife species, endangered species in partic-
ular (Brookshire et al., 1983; Boyle and Bishop, 1987; Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001).2 However,
only a few studies focus on the contingent valuation of coyotes. Stevens et al. (1991, 1994) ﬁnd
that twenty-three percent of respondents would pay US$ 5.35 to protect coyotes, while nineteen
1See Kriström (1997) for example.
2See Loomis and White (1996) for a meta-analysis of contingent valuation studies concerned with endangered
species.
2percent would pay US$ 4.20 to control them. More numerous are the available examples of val-
uation of another, perhaps more glamorous wild canid: the wolf. These include Duﬃeld (1992);
Duﬃeld and Neher (1996); Boman and Bostedt (1999); Jorgensen, et al. (2001); and Chambers
and Whitehead (2003).
A fundamental assumption adopted by these traditional CVM models is that individuals’
responses may be interpreted as expressions of consumer preferences. However, this assumption
has been subject to challenge (Stevens et al., 1991; Kohn, 1993, Common et al., 1997). This
is because respondents to CVM surveys could be actually stating their preferences as citizens,
based on some notion of social responsibility, rather than as consumers concerned with the
maximization of individual welfare. Individuals may consider that social decisions provide an
opportunity to give higher (or lower3) valuations than what they would choose, for one reason
or another, to give in their private activities (Kelman, 1981). This might be a problem aﬀecting
especially those cases in which the context is likely to suggest that respondents act in a ‘citizen
mode.’ For example, dichotomous choice procedures based on referenda, the use of taxes as
payment vehicle, and the valuation of policies or goods that have been the subject of public
debate move away from a pseudo-market setting towards a political choice one (Blamey et
al. 1995; Blamey, 1996). Similarly, a survey worded with a focus on the respondent’s moral
responsibility as a social agent may induce more respondents to take a social point of view and
the choice of payment vehicle may provide clues to whether other individuals are supposed to
pay or not (Nyborg, 2000).
Conventionally, CVM studies try to derive measures of value based on the notion that the
respondents adopt a utility-maximizing behavior when responding to the valuation question.
However, CVM respondents are unlikely to properly assess (much less maximize) the utilities
derived from non-market goods, consider the prices of other goods, or appraise their income as
a realistic constraint. As Sagoﬀ (2003) points out, studies that investigate the motives behind
WTP for environmental goods consistently show that people base their preferences less on what
they believe will beneﬁt them than on what they judge is good in itself, meets certain standards or
3It is likely that someone directly aﬀected by a life-threatening health condition would privately support
research towards a cure with an inﬁnitely high amount. However, from a social point of view, that person would
f a v o ro n l yal i m i t e de x p e n s ed e v o t e dt ot h a tr e s e a r c hb yt h eg o v e r n m e n t .
3norms, suits the identity or character of their community, or conforms with principles appropriate
to the circumstances (Perrings, 1995, p. 836). Responses to contingent valuation questions about
environmental preservation are likely to be dominated by citizen judgements concerning social
goals and responsibilities, rather than by consumer preferences (Blamey et al. 1995). This
problem would be expected to aﬀect especially the context of wildlife valuation.
Sagoﬀ (1988) argues that the literature on CVM fails to distinguish between the individual’s
roles as consumer and as citizen. Individuals report that they base their willingness to pay for
public goods with aesthetic or spiritual signiﬁcance on their concerns as citizens more than on
their wants as consumers (Sagoﬀ, 1998):
As a citizen, I am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own interest;
with the good of the community, rather than simply the well-being of my own family.
(...) In m y role as a consumer, (...) I pursue the goals I ha ve as an individual’
(Sagoﬀ, 1988, p. 8)
This pervasive inﬂuence of citizen, rather than consumer, preferences has posed a theoretical
problem in contingent valuation studies (Blamey, 1998).
In this paper, respondents were asked how much they thought it would be reasonable to ask
all PEI residents to contribute to a program to protect coyotes based on compensating farmers
for livestock losses through an annual tax.4 The responses to the valuation question were coded
as the variable tax (see the Appendix for a list of variable deﬁnitions).
This formulation of the question clearly deviates from the deﬁnition of willingness to pay.
On the other hand, it facilitated the calculation of a response in the open-ended context. Often
respondents ﬁnd it hard to understand the concept of reservation price of willingness to pay for
voluntary donations, let alone taxes. Moreover, in the case of taxes, it is likely that respondents
would consider not the maximum tax they would pay before withdrawing their support for the
program (which is what discrete-choice analyses of the referendum type would usually try to
elicit) but some perceived-fair amount that every taxpayer should contribute. Their responses
4If farmers were to be compensated for the loss of livestock to coyotes and a compulsory tax were imposed on
all PEI residents to fund the conservation of coyotes, how much would you say would be a reasonable annual
contribution? was the exact wording of the question.
4would end up being more related to a personal judgement about acceptable fair shares than to
the value placed on the resource. As expressed by Ajzen et al. (2000):
The speciﬁc amount of money that the respondents would be willing to contribute
is expected to reﬂect the amount of money that they consider to be fair or equitable
under the stipulated circumstances. Unlike a private good, a public good or service
beneﬁts a broad segment of a community or society. People are therefore likely to
b e l i e v et h a ti t sc o s ts h o u l db eb o r n ef a i r l yb ya l lt h o s ew h oa r er e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h e
needed investment or who beneﬁt from it. (Ajzen et al. 2000)
This formulation explicitly reﬂected these concerns and therefore, the stated values do not
represent expressions of individual maximum willingness to pay.5 In fact, they could be consid-
ered closer to what would be asked under a values jury approach (Brown et al. 1995; Sagoﬀ,
1998). The respondents were told that the proceeds of the tax would be used to compensate
farmers for their losses due to coyote predation. In that sense, responds could be interpreted
as an ethically eﬃcient compensating payment for sheep farmers for preserving coyotes. This is
because they in eﬀect are asked to state how much they would like their government to spend
for coyote preservation (Kohn, 1993).6
Alternatively, the payment vehicle employed here could be seen as prompting the respondent
to engage in a role as ‘Homo Politicus with shared responsibility’ as modeled by Nyborg (2000).
This means that the respondents are forced by the wording of the valuation question to adopt
a citizen role and suggest which amount they ﬁnd socially right knowing that ‘everyone is going
to pay exactly the same.’ By ensuring that all the respondents take the same point of view (as
citizens rather than consumers) when stating their preferred amount the problem of aggregating
apples and oranges when interpreting results is avoided.
However, in this sense, it is important to stress that the values obtained depart from what a
conventional question about willingness to pay would obtain and cannot be seen as comparable
to the results of conventional contingent valuation studies. Therefore, the focus of the paper
5If all or some of the respondents behave as citizens, it is not clear that the aggregation of their stated
w i l l i n g n e s st op a yw i l ly i e l dam e a n ingful money measure of social beneﬁts (Nyborg, 2000)
6Note that in Kohn (1993)’s formulation, this choice would be elicited in two separate steps.
5lies not on the valuation issue nor the policy implications resulting from it, but rather on the
modelling of citizens’ judgements and attitudes when prompted to adopt a social perspective
on wildlife conservation issues and on the methodological implications of using diﬀerent types
of econometric speciﬁcations to explain individuals’ responses in this setting.
Econometric analysis was used to analyze the extent to which extent variations in the values
of tax were inﬂuenced by diﬀerences in socioeconomic and attitudinal drivers. Since tax does
not exactly correspond to a measure of conventional willingness to pay, not much guidance
could be obtained from economic theory and earlier research on valuation to build the models.
For example, it is often assumed that environmental conservation and wildlife conservation are
normal goods. This suggests that the validity of WTP estimates to conserve coyotes could
be investigated by checking that these WTP estimates were, for instance, positively correlated
with the respondent’s income. However, there would be no a priori expectation suggesting that
richer individuals would ﬁnd it socially desirable that everyone contributed a higher amount to
a conservation project through taxation.
However, a similarity is to be expected between the sign (if not the magnitude) of the
coeﬃcients on drivers of conventional willingness to pay and the sign of the coeﬃcients aﬀecting
tax. The main objective of this paper is to ﬁnd out about the direction of these inﬂuences and
in addition, to investigate whether there are any diﬀerences in sign between the drivers aﬀecting
the size of tax and those determining whether tax takes a null or a positive value.
A series of previous works are available on public attitudes towards coyotes. Kellert (1985)
studied the public’s attitudes towards coyotes and wolves. Stevens et al. (1994) studied percep-
tions about coyotes. These studies, among others, suggest that young, urban, female, wealthy,
and more educated individuals tend to exhibit more favorable attitudes towards predators (He-
witt, 2001). Walsh et al. (1984) found WTP for wilderness conservation positively related to
the level of education and that those who supported hunting and ﬁshing would be willing to pay
less for wilderness conservation. In principle, it would be reasonable to expect that the values
of tax responded in a similar fashion to the eﬀects of this type of variables.
In order to investigate this, multivariate regression models were used to model the correlation
between the values taken by tax and a series of variables. Several candidates were available to
6build the models. These include attributes of the household and its county of residence (age,
agesq, male, income, incomesq, educat, livestock, sheep, cats, dogs, density, incometown). A
second type of variables (E) had to do with the respondents’ previous experience with coyotes
(lastseen, problems, neighbours), while hunt attempts to proxy respondents’ attitudes towards
wildlife. The general model estimated was of the form:
tax = f(S,E,A,I) (1)
where tax is the bid stated in response to the socially acceptable level of taxation.
3 Data collection
A phone survey was conducted on a random sample of listed and unlisted residential phone
numbers from all the counties in Prince Edward Island. The latest edition of the Island’s
phonebook was complemented with direct information from the company to ﬁnd out about
the up-to-date three-digit preﬁxes (exchanges) operative in each county. Calls were made from
the hours 12:00 to 21:00, and during both weekdays and Saturdays. A male interviewer and
a female interviewer conducted the survey. The guidelines suggested by Dillman (1978)) were
followed during the diﬀerent stages of the surveying process. A total of 235 contacts with eligible
respondents were made, resulting in 155 completed questionnaires, a response rate of about 66%7
(Dillman, 1978, p. 50). This response rate was quite reasonable in a survey targeting the general
public.
In any contingent valuation survey, some targeted individuals will refuse to participate.
This leaves open the possibility of non-response bias or sample selection bias. If respondents
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from non-respondents in characteristics that inﬂuence WTP for the valued
good, non-response bias may arise (Whitehead, et al., 1993). The average age of the respondents
was 41. The average level of education of the respondents (variable educat)w a s2.6 while the
average for PEI is 2.8 The average family income level was CAN$3 8 ,784 while it is CAN$
7Out-of-service numbers and commercial numbers were discarded (see Dillman, 1978, page 238-239). Calls
meeting answering machines or no answer after ﬁve dial tones were retried once on a diﬀerent day and discarded
after two new failed attempts.
8Calculated from Stats Canada data for 2001 referring to individuals 15 years and older (Statistics Canada,
746,543 in PEI (Stats Canada). 45% o ft h er e s p o n d e n t sw e r ef e m a l ea n d55% were male, while
the average for PEI is 51% versus 49%.9 Other summary variables are provided in Table 1.
The comparison of the sample’s summary statistics with those applicable to the whole province
suggest that no systematic non-response bias should be expected, given the variables entering the
econometric models. However, the typical individual in the sample seems to be more educated
and the average family slightly poorer than their average counterparts in the population.
Apart from the questions on the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondent, addi-
tional questions about livestock ownership, pet ownership, attitudes towards hunting, and direct
or indirect experiences with coyotes were asked to evaluate the inﬂuence of these eﬀects on the
attitudes towards coyotes.10 The ﬁnal models contained only a subset of these variables. This
paper focuses on one of the last type of questions, which asked about the socially acceptable
level of taxation earmarked towards the protection of coyotes.
For this question, an open-ended format was used. Dichotomous-choice or close-ended ques-
tions are supposed to result in less uncertainty, less ‘don’t know’ answers, and lower proportions
of outlier bids. However, close-ended questions tend to yield higher estimates of WTP relative
to open-ended questions.11 Additionally, open-ended questions are more statistically eﬃcient,
which makes it possible to reliably analyze more hypothesis with a smaller sample (Langford et
al. 1998). Other studies that use open-ended questions include Brookshire et al. (1983) and
Walsh et al. (1984). Mitchell and Carson (1989) argue that open-ended surveys will be accept-
able in those cases where the respondents are familiar with the valued good and the payment
mechanism. This was the case of coyotes in PEI. Given the expected sample size and the scope
of the project, it was felt that the use of close-ended questions would compromise the analysis.
It is also unlikely that PEI residents feel familiar with the idea of using a referendum to decide
on the public funding of coyote control, which would be the preferred type of formulations for
close-ended questions.
The econometric analyses were conducted taking into account the problem of item non-
Census of Population). Refer to the Appendix for an explanation of the scale (see variable educat).
9Eﬀorts were made to try to randomly select the gender of the respondent. However, it is possible that a
higher level of cooperation was obtained from male respondents.
10The text of the full questionnaire is available upon request.
11Loomis and White (1996), however, found using meta-analysis study that the choice of question format played
a relatively minor role in estimates of WTP for endangered species.
8response. Since some respondents refused to answer some of the questions, or interrupted the
interview, some variables had missing values. Before running the regressions, these observations
were removed. The ﬁnal sample contained 143 observations. A summary of the variables involved
in the survey can be found in Table 1. The Appendix contains also a list of deﬁnitions and
descriptions of each variable.
4 Econometric Methodology
A persistent problem associated with the use of open-ended questions in contingent valuation
studies is that often many respondents state a zero willingness to pay for the environmental
change. This could be because those respondents do not positively value the change or because
they lack the ability to pay any positive amount for it. Open-ended WTP distributions are often
censored at zero because, since there is normally no possibility to state negative bid values, a
large number of responses cluster around the value zero. Failing to recognize explicitly the
censored or truncated distribution of bids in open-ended valuation surveys results in biased and
inconsistent estimates. The Tobit regression (Tobin, 1958) where the true distribution of bid
values is assumed to be truncated at zero has often been used to address this issue.
4.1 P-Tobit
The Tobit model only allows one type of zero observation, namely a corner solution, since it is
based on the implicit assumption that zeros arise only as a result of the respondent’s economic
circumstances. This might be too restrictive when some individuals would never state a positive
amount as a matter of principle (they consider, for example, that coyotes should be exterminated,
not protected) or because they will be negatively aﬀected by the provision of the good (farmers
are likely to consider coyote protection a bad). The Tobit model can be made more ﬂexible by
considering these non-supporters of conservation.
First, the proportion of respondents who are potential supporters is assumed to be p,s o
that the proportion of respondents who would never support conservation is (1 − p). For the
former group, the Tobit model applies, while for the latter group, the stated level of support
(henceforth denoted by Y ) is automatically zero. This assumption leads to the P-Tobit model,
9originally proposed by Deaton and Irish (1984). The log likelihood function for the P-Tobit
model is given by Expression 2 (Moﬀatt, 2003), whose maximization returns an estimate of p,



























where Φ(·) and φ(·) refer to the standard normal probability and density functions, respec-
tively.
4.2 The Double hurdle model
The P-Tobit model fails to analyze the factors that will make a respondent more or less likely
to be a participant in the market (a supporter of coyote conservation). A further generalization
allows for the parameter p to vary according to respondent’s characteristics. This results in the
Double-Hurdle model. Its underlying assumption in this setting is that individuals make two
decisions with regard to their willingness to pay for coyote conservation. The ﬁrst decision is
whether they will state any positive amount at all at all. The second is about the amount they
will state, conditional on the ﬁrst decision. In the consumption literature these two decisions are
whether to spend and how much to spend. The Double-Hurdle model allows for the possibility
that these two decisions are aﬀected by a diﬀerent set of variables.
This model, originally due to Cragg (1971), has been extensively applied in a variety of
areas. Applications include Burton, Dorsett and Young’s (1996) and Newman (2001), who
model household meat expenditure; Jensen and Yen (1996), who model US food expenditure
away from home; Yen and Jones (1996 and 1997) who apply the model to alcohol consumption
and US household consumption of cheese, respectively; Vredin-Johansson (1999), who analyzes
charitable donations, and Moﬀatt (2003), who models loan defaults. The model has been rarely
used in the area of conventional contingent valuation. Some exceptions would be Goodwin et
al. (1993), Yen et al, (1997) and Reiser and Shechter (1999).
The Double-Hurdle model is a parametric generalization of the Tobit model, in which the
decision to participate in the market (support coyote conservation) and the level of participation
10(stated amount for tax) are determined by two separate stochastic processes. The Double-Hurdle
model has a participation (D)e q u a t i o n :
Di =1 if D∗
i > 0 and 0 if D∗
i ≤ 0 (3)
D∗
i = α0Zi + ui
being D∗ a latent participation variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent supports
the provision of the environmental good and 0 otherwise, Z a vector of household characteristics
and α a vector of parameters; and a level of participation (Y )e q u a t i o n :

   
   
Yi = Y ∗
i if Y ∗




i = β0Xi + vi
(4)
where Yi is the observed answer to the open-ended valuation question, X is a vector of the
individual’s characteristics and β a vector of parameters.
The decisions of whether to participate in the market and about the size of Y can be jointly
modelled, if they are made simultaneously by the individual; independently, if they are made
separately; or sequentially, if one decision is made ﬁrst and aﬀects the other one (this is the
dominance model). If the independence model applies, the error terms are distributed as follows:
ui ∼ N(0,1)
vi ∼ N(0,σ2)
If both decisions are made jointly (the Dependent Double Hurdle) the error term can be deﬁned







The model is a dependent model if there is a relationship between the decision to support






If ρ =0and there is dominance (the zeros are only associated to non-participation, not stan-
dard corner solutions) then the model decomposes into a Probit for participation and standard
OLS for Y .
The error terms vi and ui in Equations 3 and 4 are usually assumed to be independently12
and normally distributed. The latter assumption is not tenable in this application, so nonnor-
mality will be further considered below (see Section 4.3.2). It was initially assumed that for
each respondent the decision whether to participate in the market and the decision about the
participation level were made independently. The validity of the assumption was tested formally
(see Section 5.4).





























Under the assumption of independency between the error terms vi and ui, the model (as
originally proposed by Cragg, 1971) is equivalent to a combination of a truncated regression
model and a univariate Probit model. The Tobit model, as presented above, arises if λ =
β
σ and
X = Z. The parameters of the participation equation can be estimated independently using a
truncated regression model.
A simple test for the Double-Hurdle model against the Tobit model can be used. It can be
shown that the Tobit log-likelihood is the sum of the log-likelihoods of the truncated and the
Probit models. Therefore, one simply has to estimate the truncated regression model, the Tobit
model and the Probit model separately and use a likelihood ratio (LR)t e s t .T h eLR−statistic
can be computed using (Greene, 2000):
12See Smith (2003) for a formal theoretical analysis of why there might not be much gain from modelling
dependence.
12Γ = −2[lnLT − (lnLp +l nLTR)] ∼ χ2
k (7)
where LT = likelihood for the Tobit model; Lp = likelihood for the Probit model; LTR =
likelihood for the truncated regression model; and k is the number of independent variables in
the equations. If the test hypothesis is written as H0 : λ =
β
σ and H1 : λ 6=
β
σ. H0 will be




The consistency of maximum likelihood estimates for this model depends on the assumptions of
homoscedasticity and the normality of errors. Heteroskedascticity was suspected at the outset,
since, depending on their county, respondents had diﬀerent probabilities of having been sam-
pled. As it is recommended in the case of survey analysis, weights were introduced so that the
variance was allowed to vary according to each respondent’s probability of having been sampled:
e σ2
i = σ2
i/probi. Additionally, the maximum-likelihood speciﬁcation was ﬂexibilized further by
modelling the transformed e σ2
i explicitly as a function of several variables. This is a commonly
adopted solution in previous works (Jensen and Yen, 1996; Yen et al.1996; Yen and Huang,
1996; Angulo et al 2001).
4.3.2 Non-Normal Error Structure
A conditional moment test against the null of normal errors was conducted as performed by
STATA 8.1 (Statacorp, 2003). The procedure implements a conditional moment test for testing
the null hypothesis that the disturbances in the Tobit have a normal distribution. This test was
derived by Pagan and Vella (1989), building on work by Newey (1985) and Tauchen (1985).13
13Skeels and Vella (1999) found that using the asymptotic distribution of this test produces severe size distor-
tions, even in moderately large samples. Drukker (2002) suggested a parametric bootstrap to correct the size
distortion and showed that even with the bootstrap critical values, the test still has reasonable power for samples
greater than 500. This additional test was also conducted and, as described in Section 5.2, its results would
cast doubt on the non-normality of the Tobit residuals. However, since the sample size is smaller than 500, the
normality of the residuals was not relied upon.
13The Double-Hurdle model relies on the assumption of normality of the errors ui and vi.I ft h i s
assumption is not tenable, the ML estimates will be inconsistent. One way to accommodate the
assumption of normality is by transforming the dependent and latent variables. The dependent
variable Y was manipulated using a Box-Cox transformation (also used among others by Yen,
1993 Jones and Yen, 2000 and Moﬀatt, 2003).
Y T =
Y λ − 1
λ
0 < λ < 1
Note that the Box-Cox transformation above includes as special cases a straightforward
linear transformation (λ =1 ), and the logarithmic transformation (λ → 0), but normally we
would expect the parameter λ to lie between these extremes.

































This expression is similar to Expression 6 but the use of Y T instead of Y in the ﬁnal term
requires a Jacobian term Y λ−1 to be included (Moﬀatt, 2003).
4.4 Independence of errors
An alternative to the assumption of independence of errors would be to assume that the par-
ticipation decision dominates the consumption decision. This would imply that no individual
is observed at a standard corner solution, and that once the ﬁrst hurdle is passed, standard
Tobit censoring is no longer relevant, since no participant individual would have a zero as con-
sumption level (Jones, 1989). All the zeros would be generated by the participation decision. In
some contexts, the idea that participation in consumption dominates actual consumption is very
appealing. For example, it is reasonable to assume that once an individual decides to smoke,
for example, consumption takes place (Garcia and Labeaga, 1996). Therefore, there would be
no smokers that consumed zero tobacco products. This model that assumes dependence and
14dominance (equivalent to a Heckman’s generalized Tobit or sample selection model) could be
decomposed into a Probit and a truncated regression. Complete dominance together with in-
dependency would result in a model that could be estimated as a Probit plus ordinary least
squares.
The hypothesis of independence was tested and could not be rejected (see Section 5.4)
Heckman’s maximum likelihood and two-step approaches were investigated, too14. The latter
conﬁrmed that a model of ﬁrst hurdle dominance was not appropriate in this case. That is,
some potential supporters of coyote conservation exhibited corner solutions (stated a value of
zero for tax). The next section describes the results of the econometric exercises employed to
model tax.
5R e s u l t s
The mean value obtained for tax was $11.54.15 In the following paragraphs the results of regress-
ing the stated values of tax against a series of variables as explained in Section 2 are summarized.
Further details can be found in the tables included in the Appendix. The variables used are also
listed and described in the Appendix, and Table 1 includes summary statistics for the sample
values. The regressions were analyzed using robust estimators to account for clustering within
counties. The dependent variable (tax) was transformed beforehand into Y = tax/10. This
transformation made possible a smoother and faster convergence of the most complex maximum
likelihood regressions. There were some problems of multicollinearity between diﬀerent variables
whose suitability was tested as explanatory variables. This forced us to leave some ap r i o r irele-
vant variables out, such as sex of the respondent (male). However, the variables included in the
ﬁnal models show no serious problems of multicollinearity. If educatsq is excluded, the mean
VIF for the variables in the Y equation is 1.12.
In limited dependent variable models, it is typically diﬃcult to quantify the eﬀects of ex-
planatory variables on the dependent variable. This is particularly true for the models used in
this paper, because the Double-Hurdle parametrization, the dependent error speciﬁcation, and
14The results of these estimations are not reported but are available upon request.
15This mean was adjusted according to the STATA 8.1’s survey handling procedures to account for the diﬀerent
probability of having been sampled according to the county of origin (STATA, 2003)
15the Box-Cox transformation all complicate the eﬀects of explanatory variables. Detailed quan-
titative eﬀects of explanatory variables are usually omitted in applications of Double-Hurdle
models. The main interest of this study is testing whether univariate of bivariate models are
most appropriate to model the survey responses about tax. The focus lies on the main diﬀer-
ences between the variables aﬀecting the decision to participate in the conservation market and
the variables aﬀecting the choice of participation level, as well as the direction of the inﬂuence
for the same variables. Since, as explained above, it is not possible to draw meaningful policy
conclusions from the numerical results when a citizen perspective is considered, the actual values
of the coeﬃcients were of secondary importance. The calculation of marginal eﬀects and elastic-
ities from the maximum likelihood regressions was not attempted also because the consistency
of this type of estimators is valid only for large samples.
5.1 Tobit model versus Double-Hurdle model
The ﬁrst step of the analysis consisted of testing the Tobit model against the alternative of a
Probit plus a Truncated (at zero) regression model. The Tobit model’s results are reported in
the ﬁrst column of Table 2.16 The other two columns show the results of using the same list
of variables to explain separately the decision to support conservation (D)i nt h em a r k e tf o r
conservation (at least hypothetically) and the decision about to which extent to do so (Y ). The
result of the formal test, described in Section 5.3, between the Tobit and the two-step modelling
(using a Probit plus a Truncated regression) favored the use of the double-hurdle model. The
test statistic Γ =2 0 .19 exceeds the critical value (χ2(9) = 16.92)a tt h e5 %l e v e lo fs i g n i ﬁcance.
The less formal diagnostic of comparing the estimates βProbit with β/σTobit also showed that
there is not a great deal of similarity between both. This suggests that the Tobit model would
not be appropriate to explain why some respondents state a zero value for tax.I tw o u l dy i e l d
incomplete and potentially misleading results about the inﬂuence of the diﬀerent factors on the
size of tax. The decision to state a positive value for tax and the decision about how much to
state appear governed by diﬀerent processes. However, it is noteworthy that only in the case of
the sheep and incometown variables, the sign of the eﬀect was diﬀerent in each model.
16In all tables, p-values appear below each coeﬃcient estimate.
16[TABLE 2 about here]
5.2 Box-Cox Tobit and Box-Cox P-Tobit
A conditional moment test against the null of normal errors was conducted as performed by
STATA 8.1 (Statacorp, 2003) as described in Section 4.3. The statistic 12.268 resulted in a Prob
> χ2 =0 .00217, so the normality assumption was clearly rejected. This is not surprising since
the variable tax was strongly skewed. Since the normality of the errors in the previous Tobit
equation is questionable, the Box-Cox transformation was applied to the dependent variable
(tax/10) before running a new (Box-Cox) Tobit. The Box-Cox P—Tobit results are also shown
in the same table (Table 3). The Box-Cox Tobit nests the Tobit model and a likelihood-ratio
test suggests that the Tobit model is too restrictive (χ2(1) = 6.54 so Prob > χ2 =0 .011). The
corresponding tests of Box-Cox P-Tobit versus Tobit (χ2(2) = 24.57 so Prob > χ2 =0 .011)a n d
Box-Cox P-Tobit versus Box-Cox Tobit (χ2(1) = 18.04 so Prob > χ2 =0 .000) show that it can
be rejected that the less ﬂexible models are not too restrictive.
Therefore, these two models dominate the Tobit, which they nest, but do not improve sub-
stantially the analysis. Note, in particular, the poor and anomalous performance of the P-Tobit,
which suggests that modelling the proportion of no-participants as a ﬁxed proportion is not a
good idea. The estimate of p exceeds unity, contradicting the notion of probability and revealing
that the ﬁrst hurdle of the model is misspeciﬁed and that it is necessary to consider another
source of censoring other than the restrictive ones available through the Tobit and P-Tobit
speciﬁcations (Garcia and Labeaga, 1996; Maki and Nishiyama, 1996).
The next step involved allowing the probability of participating in the market (potentially
stating a positive value for tax) to vary between respondents according to a series of character-
istics.
[TABLE 3 about here]
5.3 Double hurdle versus Box-Cox Double Hurdle
Table 4 shows the results of the Double-Hurdle regression and the Box-Cox Double Hurdle.
These results appear much more sensible. It can now be seen that there is a diﬀerent set of
17variables behind the decision to state a positive willingness to contribute to the conservation
of coyotes and the decision about how much to state as tax. However, although it can clearly
be rejected that all the slope coeﬃcients of the variables in the participation equation (D)a r e
null, their individual signiﬁcance is not overwhelming. The magnitude and sign of most of the
coeﬃcients are not diﬀerent from those in the Tobit-like regressions above.
The Tobit-like models are nested in the double hurdle models, so likelihood-ratio tests used
to formally investigate the diﬀerences between them.
The Double Hurdle is not radically diﬀerent from the Tobit (χ2(7) = 6.26 so Prob>χ2 =
0.509) according to this test. Similarly, it cannot be rejected that Box-Cox Tobit is ﬂexible
enough, if compared with the Box-Cox Double Hurdle (χ2(6) = 7.66 so Prob > χ2 =0 .264),
according to this test. This is even more evident in the case of comparisons involving the Box-
Cox P-Tobit model which yields a log of pseudo-likelihood higher than the one for the Box-Cox
Double Hurdle.
The objective of the paper was to ﬁnd out whether it is important to analyze separately the
decisions whether to reveal potential support for coyotes and, if so, how strongly. At this stage,
it is unclear that the explicit modelling of these two separate decisions is necessary. However,
some speciﬁcation issues might remain unsolved at this point, and these are dealt with in the
next subsection.
[Table 4 about here]
5.4 Accounting for heteroskedasticity and testing the assumption of inde-
pendence of errors
The previous models considered the possibility that errors were not independent within counties
by calculating robust standard errors corrected to account for this clustering. However, they did
not take into account that those observations coming from more populated counties might be
more reliable than others for which the probability of an individual’s being selected is higher.
This is why the Double Hurdle and Box-Cox Double Hurdle were modiﬁed by weighting the
variance according to each respondent’s probability of having been sampled. Additionally, the
18maximum-likelihood speciﬁcation was ﬂexibilized further by modelling the transformed e σ2
i ex-
plicitly as a function of several variables. In particular, educat, educatsq, income, density and
hunt proved to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the variance. The results are shown in Table 5.
The Double Hurdle corrected for heteroskedasticity nest the uncorrected ones. The likelihood-
ratio tests clearly show that the models that account for heteroskedasticity are signiﬁcantly
more appropriate than the previous ones. (χ2(4) = 82.31 for the Double-Hurdle models, and
χ2(5) = 78.22,in the Box-Cox transformed cases, both with Prob>χ2 =0 .000). The test also
favors the double hurdle speciﬁcation over the P-Tobit one.17
[Table 5 about here]
The results of these most ﬂexible models reveal that the process generating a zero response
and the process behind the size of tax are diﬀerent. This is in line with the expectation that
some of the respondents considered coyotes a public bad, while others considered them a public
good. While the former should be expected to always, as a matter of principle, state a zero re-
sponse regardless of their circumstances, the latter should be expected to state variable amounts
depending on their socioeconomic characteristics. The objective of the paper was to ﬁnd out
whether it is important to analyze separately these two processes. It can be seen now that a
diﬀerent set of variables govern each process. The coeﬃcients of the variables that are common
to both sets often present opposite signs, apart from diﬀerent sizes. The actual size of the
estimates and the marginal eﬀects of changes in each variable are of secondary importance. It
is interesting, however, to comment on how the diﬀerent variables considered work within each
process.
The eﬀect of age on participation (D) is U-shaped and highly signiﬁcant in the Box-Cox
Double-Hurdle, suggesting that respondents around thirty-nine (
−(−0.720933)
0.009258·2 =3 8 .936)y e a r s
of age would be the least likely to state a positive amount for coyote protection through tax.
This could be explained by the fact that these respondents exhibit the least favorable attitude
towards coyotes and also perhaps a negative attitude towards the use of general taxation to
support their conservation through compensations to farmers. The age variable aﬀects the
17χ
2(10) = 64.00 for the Double-Hurdle and χ
2(11) = 67.85 for the Box-Cox Double Hurdle, resulting in
Prob>χ
2 =0 .000 in both cases.
19choice of tax diﬀerently, with a negative sign on agesq and a nonlinearly increasing eﬀect.
I nt h ec a s eo ft h etax model the education level of the respondent exhibits an inverted-U
shape, suggesting that as education levels approach college degrees, stated tax diminishes (for
educat =
−(2.603963)
−0.697554·2 =1 .866). In the participation model, the regular-U shape suggests that
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of age on the likelihood of participation bottoms out for a level of education
educat =
−(−2.706280)
0.591999·2 =2 .285) slightly higher than the level at which the expected size of tax
is maximum.
The variable income shows an eﬀect with opposite signs in each model but is only statistically
signiﬁc a n ti nt h ec a s eo fY , not in the case of participation (D). Those living in more urban
areas appear to support less taxes for coyote conservation, but, given the other variables, the
eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. This is not surprising in a study that asks respondents about
their judgement of how much everyone should contribute to conservation, instead of asking how
much they would individually pay. That is, the answer has more to do with the expression of a
preference than with the combination of a preference and an individual ability to pay.
Respondents who declared to hunt stated support for signiﬁcantly lower levels of tax to help
protect coyotes than non-hunters. However, hunters are much less likely to state a zero amount
for tax. There is a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of the incometown variable, probably reﬂecting
that those in richer counties are richer, tend to live in more urbanized areas, and probably have
more favorable attitudes towards coyotes. Again, this reﬂects that it is the individual perception
of how much everyone can aﬀord to pay, rather than the individual ability to pay what drives
the size of the stated value under a citizen perspective. This would not be expected to apply to
the case of a consumer perspective.
The eﬀect of sheep ownership is also highly signiﬁcant and positive. Sheep farmers in Prince
Edward Island should be against coyote conservation. However, they are usually disappointed
with lethal methods for dealing with coyote predation and would of course be wiling to support
high levels of general taxation earmarked to compensate them for losses to predation.
The hypothesis of independence between the error terms in the participation equation and
the tax equation could not be rejected. When testing null hypothesis (ρ =0in Equation 5) in
the Double-Hurdle model the Wald-statistic took the value of χ2(1) = 0.05 resulted in a Prob>χ2
20= 0.8298, while in the case of the Box-Cox Double Hurdle the statistic value of χ2(1) = 2.29
resulted in a Prob > χ2 = 0.1302. These values allow to place some conﬁdence on the validity
of the assumption of independence.
The best model overall appears to be the most ﬂexible one. This allows for a diﬀerent
set of variables to aﬀect the decision whether to support the policy and the choice on the
level of that support. It accounts for the survey nature of the data, the diﬀerent population
sizes of the diﬀerent counties where the respondent live (through prob) and considers a Box-
Cox transformation of the dependent variable (tax/10), which accounts for the non-normal
distribution of residuals resulting from the use of the untransformed variable. The ﬁnal model
clearly outperforms the rest in terms of the AIC criterion, the Wald χ2 and the plausibility of
the results.
T h es a m p l es i z ed i dn o tm a k ei tp o s s i b l et oi n t r o d u c es o m ev a r i a b l e si nt h em o d e lt h a t
might add interesting economic insight. Variables such as male, coyote, lastseen, problems,
cats, dogs were considered in diﬀerent models, but the constraints imposed by the need to
achieve convergence of the maximum likelihood regressions and the problems of multicollinearity
prevented them from appearing in the ﬁnally reported model.
6 Conclusions and suggestions for further research
The results show that some PEI residents would be willing to support an increase in general
taxes to protect coyotes. However, the degree of support to this conservation policy depends on
their socioeconomic status, their age, their county of residence, and certain attitudes towards
wildlife.
The main aim of the paper was to investigate the drivers explaining the responses of indi-
viduals to a valuation question framed within a citizen, rather than a consumer perspective. As
expected, the eﬀect of most variables on the stated socially acceptable increase in taxes goes in
the same direction as the one they would be expected to have on the conventional willingness
to pay. One unsurprising exception is the case of household income.
The second main objective of the paper was to evaluate the usefulness of the double-hurdle
speciﬁcation in the context of wildlife valuation. The results stress the importance of modelling
21separately the decision on whether to support an environmental cause and the decision about
how much to contribute to that cause. This is particularly important when considering species
that sectors of the public consider public bads rather than public goods. Many of the zero
responses obtained are not simple corner solutions. They have more to do with the fact that the
respondent is not willing to support the protection of the species regardless of circumstances that
might aﬀect the the degree of support if she was in principle willing to support that protection.
The Eastern coyote is one clear example of this type of species. The same analysis could be
applied to similar cases, such as wolves, bears, or Canada geese.
It is not possible to derive meaningful policy implications from this type of analysis in
isolation. Given the way in which the valuation scenario was presented, it is possible that
some of the respondents were not expressing how much they care about coyotes themselves, but
rather how much they cared about coyotes being controlled. That is, they expressed through
their responses not their social preference to preserve coyotes, but rather their dislike of killing
coyotes because they aﬀect sheep farming.
In the same sense, it is not easy to discern to which extent the respondents are expressing
support for coyote conservation or support for compensation to aﬀected farmers. The valuation
scenario gained realism with the introduction of the idea of compensation, but this also com-
plicated the interpretation of the results within a cost-beneﬁt analysis setting (as explained by
Diamond and Hausman, 1994).
The analysis presented in this paper was also limited in terms of sample size. The use of
open-ended questions was forced in the ﬁrst place by the size of the sample and the limitations
of the data collection process. It would be interesting to employ close-ended questions and
compare the results with those above.
Adopting a citizen perspective when responding to the valuation question implies that the
respondent is expressing a judgement about the instrumental value derived from the resource,
the perceived fairness of the payment vehicle and the proposed policy scheme, the perceived
impact on himself or herself and also on the impact of others of that proposed policy, as well
as a judgement about what society should sacriﬁce to preserve the resource. In summary, the
type of responses obtained in this study do not correspond to the individual’s valuations of the
22good, which could be aggregated to estimate the total value. However, they could be used to
estimate what citizens think the government should consider when making decisions about coyote
conservation. The type of approach employed here might be useful to predict how the public
would respond to conservation policies involving governmental intervention and to complement
the insights obtained through conventional valuation exercises. Although the Homo Economicus
was not interrogated in this occasion about willingness to pay, the opinion of the Homo Politicus
about a socially acceptable payment and the way in which this payment appears to be aﬀected
by certain variables could inform management policies that consider not only eﬃciency issues,
but also subjective concerns about the fairness of the decision-making process, the distribution of
gains and losses, the intrinsic value of wildlife species, and cultural and social values. This type
of approach is most relevant in cases in which the policy concerned generates a number of clear
losers and a variety of diﬀuse winners (including future generations), the resource is nonrival,
there is no experience nor realistic expectation of individual payments towards the conservation
of the resource, non-use values, such us existence values, take up a potential large component
of the value, and when the management of the resource entails actions, such as coyote trapping,
that could be seen as controversial. In sum, this approach is more appropriate for situations
that have to do more with individuals’ political views than with their consumer interests, for
decisions that require individuals to judge more than their own individual welfare..
This is, to the author’s knowledge, the ﬁrst time that this type of analysis has been conducted.
One obvious extension would be the comparison of the values obtained under a citizen-like ap-
proach and under a consumer-like approach for two diﬀerent samples of the same population. It
is likely that depending on the type of good, the estimated social value is sometimes underesti-
mated and sometimes overestimated by the purely economic value obtained through conventional
contingent valuation.
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27Appendix: Variables description.
Note that some of these where considered but removed from the ﬁnally reported models.
D (binary variable: 1 if tax>0a n d0o t h e r w i s e )
density (population density in the county according to STATS CANADA)
incometown (average annual income in the county according to STATS CANADA)
age age of the respondent
male binary variable regarding sex of the respondent
educat education level (ordered dummies from 1= less than high school, 2= high school; 3 = some
college to 4 = college degree)
livestock binary=1 if respondent has any livestock
sheep binary=1 if respondent has any sheep
cats binary=1 if respondent has any cats
dogs binary=1 if respondent has any dogs
hunt binary=1 if respondent hunts
coyote binary=1 if respondent ever saw a coyote in PEI
lastseen when the respondent saw the coyote last 1 = never 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 = very recently
problems binary=1 if respondent ever had trouble with coyotes in PEI
neighbours binary=1 if respondent ever heard about trouble with coyotes in PEI
tax amount considered reasonable for a tax imposed on all PEI residents to fund a program that
compensated farmers for the livestock lost to coyotes
income household gross income categories, mean points of interval used ($25000, $35000, $45000,
and $55000)
pop2001 population in the county according to STATS Canada
Probpop2001/number of observations per county
Y = tax/10
Y T (Box-Cox transformed tax/10)
28Variable Obs Survey-corrected Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 143 41.34337 43.81818 17.25845 12 82
educat 143 2.641994 2.559441 0.983114 1 4
income 143 38703.63 38566.43 12356.53 25000 55000
density 143 109.2227 179.8637 261.6321 6.06264 923.1068
hunt 143 0.047765 0.1188811 0.324786 0 1
incometown 143 19876.4 18791.64 3081.899 1782 24213
sheep 143 0.011758 0.013986 0.117845 0 1
tax 143 11.5358 10.32168 18.59572 0 100
prob 143 8162.111 1065.099 2759.031 39 19452.67
D 143 0.567482 0.4825175 0.501451 0 1
Table 1: Sample summary statistics
29Variable Tobit Probit Truncated
Dependent Y D Y(|Y>0)
agesq -0.0007956 -0.0003237 -0.0036505
0.000 0.000 0.288
educat 1.600814 0.2925457 24.27679
0.323 0.646 0.514
educatsq -0.36041 -0.1036454 -3.705436
0.244 0.378 0.579
income .0000313 0.0000086 .0004148
0.220 0.328 0.419
density 0.0015031 0.0006634 .0013881
0.153 0.055 0.813
hunt -1.674013 -0.6419249 -5.55173
0.089 0.037 0.716
incometown 0.0001514 0.0000919 -0.0009164
0.142 0.046 0.513
sheep -0.1720902 0.2416379 -55.55016
0.941 0.840 0.367




χ2(8) LR =27.13 Wald=59.99
0.0007 0.0000
Pseudo R-sq 0.1473
LOG − L -212.07931 -84.442223 -117.53976
AIC(-LOG-L+k/n) 1.539016154 0.534561 0.7660123
χ2-Test Double Hurdle versus Tobit: Γ =20.19>χ2(9)=16.92;
CM(H0 of normally distributed errors)= 12.268 Prob > χ2=0.00217
Table 2: Tobit versus Probit and Truncated regression


























Wald χ2(8) 68.46 16.42
0.0000 0.0367
LOG − L -208.80975 -199.84562
AIC(-LOG-L+k/n) 1.404263986 -1.341577762
Table 3: Box-Cox Tobit versus Box-Cox P-Tobit
31Variable Double Hurdle Box-Cox Double Hurdle
Dependent Y D YT D
age -0.2102686 -0.3038477
0.662 0.273
agesq -0.0006438 0.0011977 -0.0005384 0.0026789
0.000 0.791 0.000 0.310
educat 1.9712571 -23.71698 2.1852670 -5.43576
0.240 0.000 0.095 0.170
educatsq -0.4045376 3.4836924 -0.4533813 0.8933262
0.230 0.000 0.075 0.117
income 0.0000556 -0.0001705 0.0000550 -0.0000566
0.016 0.013 0.035 0.027
density 0.0013346 0.0010182
0.030 0.090
hunt -2.047377 5.2415280 -2.003132 0.7040805





constant -5.529864 56.056543 -6.635814 19.094727





Wald χ2(8) 53.32 66.24
0.0000 0.0000
LOG − L -208.94724 -204.98158
AIC(-LOG-L+k/n) 1.5171135 1.4893817
Table 4: Double-Hurdle versus Box-Cox Double Hurdle
32Variable Double Hurdle Box-Cox Double Hurdle
Dependent Y D σ YT D σ
age -0.719278 -0.720933
0.017 0.021
agesq -0.0006701 0.009289 -0.0006216 0.009258
0.000 0.009 0.000 0.013
educat 2.9208886 -2.686611 -2.474401 2.6039633 -2.706280 -2.139687
0.000 0.082 0.026 0.001 0.077 0.029
educatsq -0.7835407 0.595458 0.774878 -0.6975537 0.591999 0.662555
0.999 0.053 0.003 0.056 0.055 0.004
income -0.0000361 0.000006 0.000007 -0.0000313 0.000008 0.000007
0.009 0.869 0.061 0.004 0.834 0.001
density -0.0001640 0.002178 -0.0003215 0.001951
0.896 0.025 0.793 0.010
hunt -2.238339 5.344543 2.188951 -2.148186 5.384226 1.904007





constant -0.7595202 15.850587 -1.770602 15.924159
0.502 0.017 0.103 0.020
λ 0.830860
0.000
Wald χ2(8) 4750.84 3067.31
0.000 0.000
LOG − L -167.7904749 -165.8681519
AIC(-LOG-L+k/n) 1.22930402 1.215861202
Table 5: Double-Hurdle versus Box-Cox Double-Hurdle accounting for heteroskedasticity
33